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HALEY AND THE BLOWFISH 
MARK D. WEST∗ 
The central debate of Japanese legal studies is easy to summarize, or, 
for that matter, to caricature. Takeyoshi Kawashima argued in the 1960s 
that cultural factors keep Japanese litigation rates low.1 Kawashima’s work 
in English was, according to John Haley, “probably the most widely cited 
English language article on Japanese law.”2 Haley countered a decade later 
that Japanese reluctance to litigate was a “myth,” and that, in fact, 
institutions were responsible for the lack of litigation.3 Haley’s classic 
work appeared in Japanese and English contemporaneously,4 and became 
a fixture in the United States and Japan for explaining Japanese litigation 
patterns.5 
Over the next three decades, new explanations were offered,6 the old 
ones were tweaked,7 and more evidence was gathered,8 but the basic 
institutions-versus-society paradigm remained. A few of us argued that the 
dichotomy was false,9 a realization that law students reached in classrooms 
long before it was published. But a cursory examination of Japanese law 
 
 
 ∗ Nippon Life Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
 1. TAKEYOSHI KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI [JAPANESE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS] 
(1967); Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE 
LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963). 
 2. John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359, 359 n.1 
(1978).  
 3. Id. Haley outlined the argument in a book review a year earlier in the same publication. See 
John O. Haley, Book Review, 3 J. JAPANESE STUD. 440, 446 (1977) (reviewing ALFRED C. OPPLER, 
LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK (1976)) (“What little direct 
evidence there is of Japanese attitudes, however, fails to support any notion of a Japanese 
unwillingness to litigate even when mediation has failed. There is, on the other hand, ample evidence 
of institutional barriers to litigation. In Japan, for instance, the courts are even more strained to 
capacity than in the United States.”). 
 4. John O. Haley, Saiban Kirai no Shinwa, (pts. 1 & 2) 902 HANREI JIHŌ 14, 907 HANREI JIHŌ 
13 (1978) (Shintarō Katō trans.). 
 5. See, e.g., YASUO WATANABE ET AL., TEKISUTOBUKKU GENDAI SHIHŌ [TEXTBOOK ON THE 
MODERN LEGAL SYSTEM] 224–30 (4th ed. 2000). 
 6. Most notably, see J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement 
Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 266–70 (1989) (arguing that 
predictability reduces litigation). 
 7. See, e.g., Setsuo Miyazawa, Taking Kawashima Seriously: A Review of Japanese Research 
on Japanese Legal Consciousness and Disputing Behavior, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 219 (1987). 
 8. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis 
of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31 (2006). 
 9. See, e.g., ERIC A. FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN: LAW, SOCIETY, AND HEALTH 
POLICY 160–62 (2000); Mark D. West, The Resolution of Karaoke Disputes: The Calculus of 
Institutions and Social Capital, 28 J. JAPANESE STUD. 301 (2002). 
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syllabi and casebooks reveals that the Kawashima-versus-Haley debate 
remains central to the field.10 
If the debate is framed in those terms, Haley has been unjustly 
pigeonholed into the simplistic role of the cultural naysayer. His body of 
work is much more nuanced and complex. The 1978 article that took on 
cultural explanations also recognized the importance of reputation and the 
potential offensiveness of litigation in Japan.11 His 1982 article on “law 
without sanctions” began by agreeing with Kawashima’s simile of an 
heirloom samurai sword to the law in Japan and ended with a discussion of 
reputation, community cohesion, consensus, and norms.12 Four years later, 
Haley wrote that apology “may be accurately described as cultural and 
perhaps even peculiar or unique to Japan.”13 His 1991 book, Authority 
Without Power, spoke of “harmony and cohesion,”14 and his 1998 book, 
The Spirit of Japanese Law,15 argued for the centrality of community in 
Japan. 
I don’t think Haley is trying to hedge his bets unfairly by straddling the 
fence that separates culture and institutions; rather, the dual theoretical 
lines reveal a scholar who is able to keep two thoughts in his head at the 
same time, an ability we recognize as crucial for lawyers and legal 
scholars. Sometimes cultural arguments work better than institutional 
ones, sometimes institutional arguments make more sense, and sometimes 
the two work in tandem.  
I credit Haley with a second insight in the field: law does not always 
affect behavior directly. A substantial literature shows how parties create 
their own rules in the absence of law, in Japan and elsewhere.16 Haley has 
made a slightly different point: laws can help society order itself in 
 
 
 10. See, e.g., CURTIS J. MILHAUPT, J. MARK RAMSEYER, & MARK D. WEST, THE JAPANESE 
LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND COMMENTARY 151–76 (2006). 
 11. Haley, supra note 2, at 371, 378. 
 12. John O. Haley, Sheathing the Sword of Japanese Justice: An Essay on Law Without 
Sanctions, 8 J. JAPANESE STUD. 65 (1982). 
 13. John O. Haley, Comment, The Implications of Apology, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 499, 499–500 
(1986). 
 14. JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 176 
(1991). 
 15. JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (1998). 
 16. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991); Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish 
Market, 94 CAL. L. REV. 313 (2006); Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan’s Secret 
World of Sumo, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997); Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the World’s First 
Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574 (2000). 
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indirect ways, functioning “more as tools for consensus building and 
leverage than coercive instruments of state control.”17 
In this Article, I want to explore these two insights of Haley’s in an off-
the-beaten-path subject of regulation: blowfish. (That I am able to get so 
far off the beaten path is a luxury I owe to Haley, who, with a few others, 
created the path in the first place.) I ask two questions. First, why have 
blowfish poisoning rates fallen over time? Second, why do so few 
blowfish poisoning cases go to court? 
I. THE FISH 
Blowfish is a generic name for several members of the fish family 
tetraodontidae, a fish that can swell itself to several times its normal size 
by swallowing air or water. The tetraodontidae family has 187 known 
species, of which about fifty can be found in Japan, and about ten of which 
are regularly eaten there.18 The most common blowfish served in Japan is 
torafugu (Takifugu rubripes), or tiger blowfish, the largest among Japan’s 
species. It is also one of the most poisonous. 
The poison, tetrodotoxin, is highly concentrated in the organs, 
especially the liver and the ovaries.19 Generated by bacteria that live in the 
fish, the poison is 1250 times deadlier than cyanide20 and 160,000 times 
more potent than cocaine. One fish can kill thirty adults.21  
A small amount of poison creates a stinging numbness in the lips, 
tongue, and extremities.22 A bit more produces the same effect, and 
eventually paralysis, in the lungs, which leads to death.23 There is no 
known antidote; the treatment usually consists of pumping the patient’s 
stomach, placing him on artificial respiration and intravenous hydration, 
and feeding him activated charcoal to bind the toxin.24  
 
 
 17. HALEY, supra note 14, at 200. 
 18. Nat’l Ctr. for Biotechnology Info., Taxonomy Browser, Tetraodontidae, http://www. 
fishbase.org/identification/specieslist.cfm?famcode=448&areacode= (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
 19. C.Y. Kao, Tetrodotoxin, Saxitoxin and Their Significance in the Study of Excitation 
Phenomena, 18 PHARMACOLOGICAL REVIEWS 997, 998 (1966). 
 20. Akiko Takeda, Trade Environment Database, Blowfish and Trade, Case Number 283 (May 
18, 1996), at A(2), available at http://www.american.edu/TED/blowfish.htm. 
 21. It is possible to raise non-poisonous blowfish. Blowfish farmers can change the toxicity by 
keeping blowfish swimming well above the seabed and altering their diet to make it “clean.” TAMAO 
NOGUCHI, FUGU HA NAZE DOKU WO MOTSUNOKA [WHY ARE BLOWFISH POISONOUS?] 36–40 (1996). 
 22. See, e.g., Tetrodotoxin Poisoning Associated with Eating Puffer Fish Transported from 
Japan—California 1996, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., May 17, 1996, at 389. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id at 390. In a well-publicized U.S. case, three Japanese chefs in California ate one-quarter to 
one and a half ounces of blowfish that was not reported at customs. They survived. Id. U.S. law 
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The Kobe District Court set forth a maxim of blowfish preparation: “It 
is often said that blowfish poison lies in the organs, but not in the meat.”25 
But that conventional wisdom is untrue; the poison depends on the type of 
fish, and poison organs can easily be nicked.26 Accordingly, blowfish 
preparation calls for a skilled chef. A chef first slices off the rear fin, then 
the mouth, then removes the skin. He then carefully separates the edible 
meat from the poisonous organs: into one pile go the inedible liver, 
bladder, gills, eyes, stomach, spleen, kidneys, ovaries (or testicles), heart, 
and mucous membrane. Once the organs are removed, the chef washes the 
fish carefully to remove blood and poison residue. It is then cooked (or 
not) and served.27 
II. POISONINGS 
The Japanese government collects data on blowfish poisonings.28 I 
cannot be sure that every physician always reports every poisoning 
incident, but I know of no systemic bias in reporting, and the government 
strongly encourages it. 
 
 
prohibits importation except to a small number of Japanese restaurants that have blowfish chefs 
certified by the Japanese Torafugu Buyers’ Association, and even then, “only on special occasions” 
pursuant to a 1989 bilateral agreement. See Exchange of Letters Between Japan and the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration Regarding Puffer Fish (1988–1989), available at http://www.fda.gov/oia/ 
Agreements/japeol.htm.  
 25. Adachi v. Shōga, 704 HANREI JIHŌ 80, 82 (Kobe D. Ct. Dec. 21, 1972). 
 26. MASARU KAINUMA, FUGU CHŌRISHI HIKKEI [INDISPENSABLE GUIDE FOR BLOWFISH CHEFS] 
9–16 (1986). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Doctors are required to submit a detailed “Food Poisoning Incident Report” for each case that 
lists the cause of the poisoning, the location, and the age and sex of the patient. The system is 
described in Kōseishō, Shokuchūdoku Tōkei [Food Poisoning Statistics] 9–12 (2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/16
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FIGURE 1: ANNUAL BLOWFISH POISONING VICTIMS, INCIDENTS, AND 
DEATHS, 1952–200729 
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Figure 1 represents blowfish poisoning data from 1952 to 2007. The 
top line represents the number of victims, the middle line represents the 
number of incidents, and the bottom line represents the number of deaths. 
In each category, the numbers spike in the late 1950s and again in the 
1960s, but otherwise decline steadily over time. Blowfish poisonings now 
are less likely to occur, and when they do occur, they are less likely to end 
in death. 
Three other aspects of the data are worthy of note. First, even as a 
percentage of all food poisonings, blowfish poisoning has declined 
dramatically. Blowfish poisoning accounted for 12.5% of all food 
poisonings in 1890, 16% in 1895, 20% in 1900, and 12% in 1905. By the 
1950s, the rate was 4%. In 1980, it was 4.6%, and in 2000, it had fallen to 
2%.30 The percentage decline suggests, among other possibilities, that 
Japan might be more effective in preventing blowfish poisoning than other 
types of food-caused illness. 
Second, a tidbit of data from the period between 1913 and 1915 is 
intriguing.31 For those three years, and apparently for those three years 
only, the Ministry of Health broke down its poisoning data into two 
 
 
 29. Kōseishō, Densenbyō Oyobi Shokuchūdoku Tōkei [Communicable Disease and Food 
Poisoning Statistics] (various years); Koiseishō, Shokuchūdoku Tōkei [Food Poisoning Statistics] 
(various years); Kōseishō, Nenjibetsu Shokuchū Hassei Jōkyō [Annual Food Poisoning Incidents], 
available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/syokuchu/xls/nenji.xls (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).  
 30. Calculated using data from sources supra note 29. 
 31. Kōseishō, Eisei Nenpō [Annual Sanitation Reports] (1913–1915).  
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separate categories: intentional and unintentional. The breakdown alone is 
fascinating, as it shows that some people apparently ingested blowfish 
purposely as a method of suicide. But the numbers are small: 49 of 201 
victims in 1913, 8 of 163 victims in 1914, and 5 of 140 victims in 1915 
were the result of intentional ingestion.32 The Ministry never again used 
the category, and I suspect that the trend faded as potential suicide victims 
discovered less terrifying and more effective methods. 
Finally, we have limited data on the location of blowfish poisonings.33 
The Ministry of Health categorizes poisonings by location: home, 
restaurants, hotels, and so on. The data were first published in 1952, when 
eighty-three percent of poisonings occurred at home, three percent at 
restaurants, and the rest were “other.” For the next ten years, the Ministry 
did not publish the location data. But from the time the data were first re-
published in 1963 until 2007, seventy-three percent of poisonings occurred 
at home, and fifteen percent occurred in restaurants.34 Poisonings at hotels, 
fish sellers, “other,” and “unknown” are rare (the two 1973 poisonings that 
occurred in “hospitals” are intriguing).35  
III. THE LAW 
A. Regulatory Measures 
The history of blowfish regulation in Japan is murky, and the standard 
account appears to be full of errors, until the post-war era.36 In 1947, 
 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Kōseishō, Densenbyō Oyobi Shokuchūdoku Tōkei [Statistics on Food Poisonings and 
Contagious Disease], various years; Kōseishō, Shokuchūdoku Tōkei Shiryō, various years, available 
at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/syokuchu/04.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).  
 34. The typical poisoning victim is male and in his fifties or sixties. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. The folk story holds that when Hideyoshi Toyotomi sought to conquer Korea in 1592, he 
amassed a force of 158,800 troops on Kyushu, where blowfish was a favorite dish, for the task. Many 
men died of blowfish poisoning before they reached Korea, and as a result, Hideyoshi banned 
consumption. See, e.g., YOSHIO AOKI, FUGU NO BUNKA [FUGU CULTURE] 152 (2003). The story is 
often told, but I find no evidence of it in primary or secondary academic sources.  
 A ban appears to have been in place during the Tokugawa period (1603–1868), but its scope and 
enforcement is questionable. Englebert Kaempfer, physician to the Dutch embassy in Nagasaki from 
1690 to 1693, noted that “Soldiers only and military men, are by special command of the Emperor 
forbid to buy and to eat this fish. If any one dies of it, his son forfeits the succession to his father’s 
post, which otherwise he would have been entitled to.” 1 ENGELBERT KAEMPFER, THE HISTORY OF 
JAPAN 222 (J. G. Scheuchzer trans. 1906) (1971). The 1814 chronicle Chiritsukadan states that while 
warriors “without fail” did not eat the fish, it was an “inexpensive . . . food of commoners.” 
SHIN’ICHIRŌ WATANABE, EDO NO SHŌMIN GA HIRAITA SHOKUBUNKA [FOOD CULTURE OF EDO 
COMMONERS] 72-5 (1996). Yet when archaeologists dug up the garbage pits of the samurai-stocked 
Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo, they found many blowfish bones. See, e.g., EDO ISEKI 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/16
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during the Allied Occupation, the Diet passed the Food Sanitation Law,37 
opening up the whole country to blowfish for the first time in 350 years. 
The law provides in article 6 that “No person shall sell, . . . handle, 
manufacture, import, process, use, prepare, store, or display with intent to 
sell any food . . . [that] contain[s] or bear[s] toxic or injurious substances, 
. . . provided, however, that this provision does not apply to the cases 
which are prescribed by the Minister of Health, Labour, and Welfare as 
not injurious to human health.”38 The corresponding enforcement 
regulations of the Ministry of Health, promulgated the following summer, 
effectively exempted blowfish by providing an exception for “cases where 
substances, which, though toxic or harmful, are naturally occurring in or 
on foods or additives and are deemed not harmful to human health based 
on the degree of the toxicity or harmfulness thereof or the treatments to be 
applied thereto.”39 
The Food Sanitation Law required prefectures to establish a health 
office and inspection system.40 Many prefectures went a step further, 
enacting schemes to control the serving and preparation of the dangerous 
dish. Table 1 lists the nineteen prefectures that enacted regulations in order 
of adoption.41 
 
 
KENKYŪKAI, EDO NO SHOKUBUNKA [EDO ERA FOOD CULTURE] 238–82 (1992); Constantine N. 
Vaporis, Digging for Edo: Archaeology and Japan’s Premodern Urban Past, 53 MONUMENTA 
NIPPONICA 73, 93 (1998).  
 The standard account holds that the blowfish ban was lifted during the Meiji period (1896–1912) 
but reinstated by the legislature in either 1882 or 1885 pursuant to the Order for the Disposition of 
Petty Crimes. See, e.g., AOKI, supra, at 154. The standard account further holds that in 1888, Prime 
Minister Hirobumi Ito traveled to his hometown in Yamaguchi prefecture, Japan’s blowfish capital, 
and sampled the dish. He immediately lifted the ban—but only in Yamaguchi prefecture. See, e.g., 
MARUO SHIODA, FUGU GA KUITAI [I WANT TO EAT BLOWFISH] 160–64 (2003). I find no evidence for 
this often-told story. The Order for the Disposition of Petty Crimes was enacted in 1885, but it is a 
general statute that contains no mention of blowfish or anything resembling blowfish. Ikeizai 
Sokketsurei [Order for the Disposition of Petty Crimes], Dajokan Decree No. 31 (Sept. 24, 1885) 
(reprinted in NAIKAKU HŌKYOKU, HŌREI ZENSHO [COMPLETE BOOK OF LAWS] 70 (1885)). But Prime 
Minister Itō had no authority to legislate or otherwise dictate policy in the Yamaguchi prefecture, and 
there is no primary source evidence that he did so. 
 37. Shokuhin Eisei Hō [Food Sanitation Law], Law No. 233 of 1947. 
 38. Id. art. 6. 
 39. Shokuhin Eisei Hō Sekō Kisoku [Food Sanitation Law Rules], Ministry of Health and 
Welfare Ordinance No. 23 of 1948, art. 1(a), translation available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/ 
hourei/data/oefs.pdf. 
 40. Id. art. 24. 
 41. See, e.g., KAINUMA, supra note 26, at 74. The Osaka High Court has said that prefectures (in 
particular, Hyogo, where Kobe is located) may fulfill their duty under the Food Sanitation Law, and 
therefore can avoid civil liability, if they promote blowfish safety in some other way, such as regular 
safety campaigns and educational classes. Shimizu v. Japan, 381 HANREI TAIMUZU 101 (Kobe D. Ct. 
Feb. 27, 1979), aff’d, 969 HANREI JIHŌ 55 (Osaka High Ct. Mar. 14, 1980). 
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TABLE 1: ADOPTIONS OF BLOWFISH REGULATIONS BY PREFECTURES 
Prefecture Year of Adoption 
Osaka 1948 
Tokyo 1949 
Kyoto 1950 
Ehime 1952 
Kagawa 1953 
Kumamoto 1958 
Miyazaki 1958 
Tottori 1959 
Kanagawa 1959 
Kagoshima 1960 
Kochi 1961 
Shiga 1963 
Okayama 1974 
Chiba 1975 
Aichi 1976 
Shizuoka 1977 
Nara 1978 
Fukuoka 1978 
Yamaguchi 1981 
 
Aside from the three Tokyo metropolitan area prefectures of Tokyo, 
Chiba, and Kanagawa, every prefecture that adopted regulations is in 
southern or western Japan. This distribution might be based on blowfish 
availability and popularity; southern waters have always produced more 
blowfish.42  
Tokyo’s regulatory scheme is typical.43 In Tokyo, only specially 
licensed chefs may prepare blowfish. With a few exceptions for reciprocal 
arrangements with neighboring prefectures, every applicant must 
apprentice for a two-year period and pass a blowfish test. The test, which 
costs ¥17,900 to take, contains two parts: a ninety-minute, thirty-question 
multiple-choice examination of knowledge of Tokyo rules and blowfish 
facts, and a practical test, consisting of three minutes of fish identification 
 
 
 42. See, e.g., AOKI, supra note 36, at 18–27. 
 43. Tōkyō-to Fugu no Toriatsukai Kisei Jōrei, Ordinance No. 51 (amended 1986), available at 
http://www.reiki.metro.tokyo.jp/reiki_honbun/g1010903001.html.  
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and twenty minutes for preparation of the meal.44 The multiple-choice 
section is simple for anyone who studies (one sample question: True or 
False? Torafugu is known in some areas as shiro or monfugu. Answer: 
True),45 so those who study and nonetheless fail usually do so in the 
practical part of the test.46 The pass rate is about thirty to forty percent.47 
Each prefecture’s regulatory scheme penalizes non-compliance; Tokyo 
provides for up to two years imprisonment and fines up to five hundred 
thousand yen.48 
In 1983, the Ministry of Health issued a circular that offered guidance 
to prefectures.49 The circular was the first national attempt to bring science 
into the regulatory scheme. It identified various species of blowfish and 
specified their poisonous parts and measures of poison.50 The Ministry 
outlined sanitary procedures for preparation and banned dangerous 
practices such as the serving of liver.51  
B. Tort Liability and Negligent Homicide 
In the comprehensive Lexis JP database of more than 190,000 cases, I 
count only eight incidents (some of which led to more than one case) of 
accidental blowfish poisoning (and one murder).52 Of those eight, two 
were prosecuted both civilly and criminally, five were prosecuted only in 
civil suits,53 and only one solely in a criminal suit.54 Every civil case 
 
 
 44. Tokyo Bureau of Soc. Welfare & Pub. Health, Fugu Chōrishi Shiken ni Tsuite [Regarding 
the Blowfish Chef Test] (2007), http://www.fukushihoken.metro.tokyo.jp/kenkou/shikaku/csh_ 
menkyo/hugu/huguh15/index.html. 
 45. See KAINUMA, supra note 26, at 140. 
 46. Tokyo Bureau of Soc. Welfare & Pub. Health, supra note 44. 
 47. Telephone Conversation with Tōkyōto Fukushihokenkyoku [Tokyo Bureau of Pub. Welfare 
& Soc. Health], Kenkō Anzenbu Kenkō Anzenka [Health & Safety Group, Health & Safety Div.], 
Sept. 12, 2007.  
 48. Tōkyō-to Fugu no Toriatsukai Kisei Jōrei, Ordinance No. 51 (amended 1986), available at 
http://www.reiki.metro.tokyo.jp/reiki_honbun/g1010903001.html. 
 49. KŌSEISHŌ KANKYŌ EISEIKYOKUCHŌ, FUGU NO EISEI KAKUHO NI TSUITE [REGARDING THE 
SANITARY PRESERVATION OF BLOWFISH], CIRCULAR NO. 59 OF 1983, available at http://wwwhourei. 
mhlw.go.jp/cgi-bin/t_docframe2.cgi?MODE=tsuchi&DMODE=SEARCH&SMODE=NORMAL& 
KEYWORD=%82%d3%82%ae&EFSNO=5159&FILE=FIRST&POS=0&HITSU=3 [hereinafter 
REGARDING THE SANITARY PRESERVATION OF BLOWFISH]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Japan v. Anonymous, 878 HANREI TAIMUZU 87 (Tokyo D. Ct., Sept. 22, 1994), aff’d, 982 
HANREI TAIMUZU 84 (Tokyo High Ct., Apr. 28, 1998). 
 53. Fujita v. Nishio, 370 HANREI TAIMUZU 117 (Osaka D. Ct., May 19, 1978) (finding liability 
for chef, owner of restaurant, wholesale company, and president of wholesale company); Noguchi v. 
Honma, 845 HANREI JIHŌ 97 (Chiba D. Ct., Feb. 27, 1976) (finding liability for fish seller and joint 
owners of the fish-selling company); Shimizu v. Japan, 381 HANREI TAIMUZU 101 (Kobe D. Ct., Feb. 
27, 1979), aff’d, 969 HANREI JIHŌ 55 (Osaka High Ct., Mar. 14, 1980) (finding liability for fish seller 
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resulted in liability for at least one defendant, and defendants in two of the 
three criminal cases were found guilty. Courts have found liability for fish 
sellers, restaurant owners, and negligent doctors and hospitals. The only 
party for which courts have found no liability is the state, which courts 
found did not have a duty to create and enforce stronger regulations.55 
Two incidents, each of which resulted in both civil and criminal suits, 
are sufficient to outline the state of court doctrine. In the first,56 based on 
the events of February 25, 1966, five people, all employees of Nippon 
Telegraph & Telephone, shared a blowfish pot dish that included blowfish 
liver at a Kobe restaurant owned by Shōga. One customer, Sadao Adachi, 
had a beer on his way home, had a cup of tea, and went to bed around 
11:30. At four in the morning, he awoke, vomiting. He began to lose 
control of his breathing and other muscle functions, and died at 6:45 a.m. 
The doctor listed the cause of death as blowfish poisoning. 
Adachi’s family sued, basing its case on the general tort provision of 
the Civil Code, article 709, which provides that a person “who has 
intentionally or negligently violated the right of another is obligated to 
compensate for damages arising therefrom.”57 
The defendant, Shōga, argued that the blowfish he had served was so-
called nagoyafugu (Takifugu porphyreus), the common puffer, which 
Shōga said was not as potent as torafugu.58 He had washed it well. Only 
one person out of five became ill. Even if he did serve the liver, that was 
the custom in Kobe, which, being in Hyogo prefecture, had no regulatory 
scheme for blowfish. What’s more, he had served the dish for seven years 
without incident.  
The court sided with the plaintiff: “Even if Hyogo prefecture has no 
regulatory system, and even if the [local] health inspector’s office has little 
 
 
and restaurant owner but not for government); Kimoto v. Tottori Prefecture, 420 HANREI TAIMUZU 
112 (Osaka D. Ct., June 26, 1980) (finding civil liability for hospital); Ata v. Eishō Health Corp., 565 
HANREI TAIMUZU 154 (Kobe D. Ct., May 30, 1985), aff’d, 1287 HANREI JIHŌ 80 (Osaka High Ct., 
Mar. 28, 1988) (finding liability for doctor, nurses, or hospital). 
 54. Japan v. Anonymous, 886 HANREI JIHŌ 113 (Nagano D. Ct., Dec. 24, 1977), rev’d, 966 
HANREI JIHŌ 135 (Tokyo High Court, Nov. 19, 1979) (finding criminal liability for gyōmujyō 
kashitsuchishō Zai, or negligent manslaughter by chef). 
 55. Shimizu, 969 HANREI JIHŌ 55 (finding liability for fish seller and restaurant owner but not for 
government). 
 56. This first incident became Adachi v. Shōga, 704 HANREI JIHŌ 80 (Kobe D. Ct., Dec. 21, 
1972). 
 57. MINPŌ [Civil Code of Japan], art. 709, translated in J.E. DE BECKER, ANNOTATED CIVIL 
CODE OF JAPAN, Vol. II (1909, reprinted 1979). 
 58. Fish names vary by regional dialect. Nagoyafugu is called nagoyafugu in Nagoya and Tokyo, 
namefugu in Sapporo, namera in Osaka, meaka in Kochi, nametarō in Shimane, meijo in Niigata, and 
its standard name is mafugu. See AOKI, supra note 36, at 8. 
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knowledge on the subject, and even if the custom in the Kobe region is to 
include the liver in the dish . . . Shōga knew that the liver was poisonous 
. . . and serving the dish that contained liver breached his duty of care.”59 
The court deducted twenty percent based on Adachi’s comparative 
negligence (he knew the fish was poisonous) when it awarded damages to 
Adachi’s family.60 
The Japanese Criminal Code provides for a fine or up to five years’ 
imprisonment for a killing or injury that occurs when a person “fails to use 
such care as is required in the performance of profession, occupation, or 
routine.”61 In Shōga’s criminal case, the Osaka High Court focused more 
on the preparation than in the civil case.62 Shōga bought his fish from a 
company run by a woman named Shimizu, who cut the fish for him.63 
Shōga then received the fish, removed the liver, rubbed the liver with salt 
and let it soak in water for thirty minutes, washed the rest of the fish he 
had received in salt water for two to three minutes, placed the fish in 
Tupperware in the refrigerator, and waited for the customer’s order.64 
When Adachi and his friends ordered their pot dish, Shōga used the 
blowfish and included in the pot a portion of liver equal in size to the first 
joint of an adult’s pinky. The court found that these practices were 
ordinary custom in Kobe.65  
While judges in civil law cases examine poisoning incidents through 
the lens of duty, criminal cases rely on forseeability and a reasonable 
person standard. Determining that a reasonable person in Shōga’s position 
could not have foreseen Adachi’s death, the court found Shōga not 
guilty.66 
The second, and more publicized, case is that of sixty-eight-year-old 
kabuki master and “Living National Treasure” Mitsugoro Bandō (real 
name Toshirō Morita).67 On January 15, 1975, Bandō ate blowfish liver at 
a restaurant, and died eight hours later.68 Unlike Shōga’s case, the 
restaurant in question was not in Kobe, but in neighboring Kyoto, a 
prefecture that had a local ordinance that specifically prohibited the 
 
 
 59. Adachi, 704 HANREI JIHO at 83. 
 60. Id. at 80. 
 61. KEIHŌ [Penal Code], Act No. 45 of 1907, art. 211, no. 1, translation available at 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/PC.pdf. 
 62. Japan v. Shōga, 613 HANREI JIHŌ 101 (Osaka High Ct., June 16, 1971). 
 63. Id. at 101. 
 64. Id. at 101–02. 
 65. Id. at 102. 
 66. Id. at 102–03. 
 67. Kigura v. Kasaoka, 928 HANREI JIHŌ 87 (Kyoto D. Ct., Dec. 19, 1978). 
 68. Id. at 90. 
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serving of blowfish liver.69 The court easily found the chef and restaurant 
owner liable, and after taking off thirty percent of the damages for 
comparative negligence, awarded Bandō’s heirs about sixty million yen.70 
As in Shōga’s case, Bandō’s chef, Kasaoka, was prosecuted on 
criminal charges as well.71 Kasaoka used the same argument that Shōga 
did: he was only following customary practice.72 But unlike Shōga, who 
used customary practices in ordinance-less Kobe, Kasaoka was licensed in 
Kyoto, where regulations existed.73 Bandō’s death was foreseeable, the 
Supreme Court ruled in 1980, and his chef was guilty.74 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Between 1952 and 2007, more than five thousand people in Japan were 
poisoned by blowfish. About two thousand of them died. Why are there 
only eight court cases? As the academic commentator on one case wrote in 
the Japanese court reporter, “given the number of this type of incident that 
appear in the newspapers, there are very few lawsuits.”75 Even if not all 
poisoning cases are published, eight seems to be a very low number.  
The cultural answer is simple: the victims (or their families) did not 
want to disrupt harmony through the filing of a lawsuit. That answer is not 
necessarily wrong, but it is not very helpful, as the best evidence of the 
preference for harmony (who doesn’t prefer harmony?) is the non-filing of 
the lawsuit. 
A more complete answer, Haley teaches, focuses on institutions. As in 
the general case, blowfish poisoning suits might be rare because of various 
roadblocks to litigation erected by the state: low damages, a small number 
of legal professionals, lengthy court dockets, and filing fees keep numbers 
down. The particular case of blowfish adds another dimension: plaintiffs 
always win. If plaintiffs always win, and damages are easy to calculate, 
restaurateurs would find it cheaper to settle rather than pay legal fees.76  
 
 
 69. Id. at 91. 
 70. Id. at 93. 
 71. Japan v. Anonymous, 374 HANREI TIMES 158 (Kyoto D. Ct., May 26, 1978), aff’d & rev’d 
on damages, 387 HANREI TAIMUZU 155 (Osaka High Ct., Mar. 23, 1979). 
 72. Id. at 159–61. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Japan v. Dasaoka, 34 KEISHŪ 149 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 18, 1980). The effective start of the 
Products Liability Law, in 1995 also raised concerns, as it purports to replace negligence with strict 
liability for defective products, but I found no blowfish cases that use it. Seizōbutsu Sekinin Hō 
[Products Liability Law], Law No. 85 of 1994. 
 75. Comment for Osaka High Court, 613 HANREI JIHŌ 101 (June 16, 1970). 
 76. On predictability, see J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, supra note 6. 
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Yet a role for societal causes exists as well. More than three-fourths of 
poisonings occur at home.77 We have no details on most poisonings, but a 
Ministry of Health circular from 2002 gives details on four “recent 
incidents.”78 In the first, a woman bought unprepared blowfish from a 
friend, prepared it and ate it herself, and died the next day.79 In the second, 
a woman purchased unprepared blowfish from a fish market and 
contracted poisoning but lived. In the third, a man received unprepared 
blowfish from a fishselling friend; he ate the liver and was poisoned.80 
Finally, a group of three ate liver at a restaurant, and one was poisoned.81 
The cases and the Ministry of Health circular show that most 
poisonings occur as a result of fish caught by friends or fishsellers 
(presumably many cases exist in which fishers eat their own catch). In 
both cases, the fish is sold unprepared, perhaps under the assumption that 
the home chef can prepare it correctly. Comparative negligence rules 
might reduce suits, but a social effect on litigation might also be at work, 
as a home cook would be unlikely to sue a friend or a fish seller whose 
relationship with the cook was such that he was trusted to prepare the 
blowfish properly. Doing so in a close community might be even more 
uncomfortable. 
A second central puzzle is why poisoning rates fell over time. One 
possibility is effective law. As one commentator notes, “Many accidents 
occurred before licensing was demanded.”82 According to another, 
“Thanks to strict regulations of restaurants and wholesalers, the number of 
deaths decreases each year.” The Health Ministry’s 1983 circular83 
precedes a period of sustained low poisonings, the lowest ever. The 
announcement from the central government might have played an 
important role in reducing poisonings.  
Table 2 lists the prefectures with the highest incidence of blowfish 
poisoning per capita in the past five decades. In the first five columns, 
prefectures that had a regulatory scheme in place at the time of their 
ranking are identified with an asterisk. In the final cumulative column, 
prefectures with a regulatory scheme in place at any time are so identified. 
 
 
 77. See supra note 33. 
 78. KŌSEI RŌDŌSHO IYAKUKYOKU SHOKUHIN HOKENBU KANSHI ANZENKACHŌ, FUGU NO EISEI 
KAKUHO NI TSUITE [REGARDING THE PRESERVATION OF SANITARY BLOWFISH], CIRCULAR 1024002 
(2002), available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/syokuchu/kanren/kansi/1024-1.html.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Itsuko Matsuura, Product Liability Law and Japanese-Style Dispute Resolution, 35 U. BRIT. 
COLUM. L. REV. 135, 143 & n.17 (2002). 
 83. See supra note 49. 
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TABLE 2: PREFECTURES WITH THE HIGHEST PER CAPITA POISONING 
INCIDENTS 
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1950-2000 
Yamaguchi  Ehime* Hiroshima Hyogo Kagawa* Hyogo 
Okayama  Kagawa* Yamaguchi  Shimane Fukuoka* Hiroshima 
Fukuoka Yamaguchi  Ehime*  Fukuoka Hiroshima Fukuoka* 
Kagawa Hyogo Hyogo Hiroshima Yamaguchi* Ehime* 
Hyogo Okayama  Okayama*  Tokushima Nagasaki Okayama* 
SOURCE: Compiled from annual issues of KŌSEISHŌ, SHOKUCHŪDOKU TŌKEI 
(1982– ), KŌSEISHŌ, DENSENBYŌ OYOBI SHOKUCHŪDOKU TŌKEI (1952—1982), 
and KŌSEISHŌ, EISEI NENPŌ (pre-1982). 
 
The table suggests no direct relation between regulation and poisoning. 
Instead, another relation is clear: incidents correlate with geography. The 
northernmost prefecture in the fifty-year period, Hyogo, is south of Tokyo, 
Kyoto, and Osaka. Only nineteen prefectures fall to its south, and ten of 
them, most of which had appeared in the top five over multiple decades, 
are in the table. Not coincidentally, those prefectures are prefectures in 
which blowfish catches are large and the dish is popular. If regulation is 
successful, we cannot find evidence of such here. 
To examine the relation between regulation and poisoning on the 
national level, I ran several regressions on prefectural per capita poisoning 
rates, controlling for regulation. I found no statistically significant 
correlation.  
The ex post prong of the law, tort and criminal liability, might have 
created deterrent effects. Blowfish preparers might have taken extra steps 
to prepare food carefully so as to avoid civil and criminal liability. But 
there is no evidence that chefs actually responded to liability in this 
fashion, and it seems likely that chefs would take as much care to avoid 
death of their customers as they would to avoid liability. 
I suspect that the ex ante and ex post legal treatment of blowfish 
functioned, as Haley puts it, “more as tools for consensus building and 
leverage than coercive instruments of state control.”84 The law helped 
solidify a consensus on the dangers of blowfish, in the minds both of chefs 
and of the public. The death of kabuki master Mitsugoro Bandō and the 
lawsuits that followed were well-publicized.85 The implicit finding that 
 
 
 84. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 14, at 200. 
 85. See, e.g., KAINUMA, supra note 26, at 76–78.  
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even a careful chef and a careful diner can die from improperly prepared 
blowfish was clear. 
Bandō’s death was followed in 1983 by the Health Ministry’s circular. 
One of the stricter provisions of the circular is a complete ban on blowfish 
liver sales.86 The ban, enforced by the threat of health inspector restaurant 
closings even in the absence of customer poisoning, was more onerous 
than the threat of tort liability. But the circular played another powerful 
role: it set national standards of care and put customers and chefs alike on 
alert as to the dangers of improperly prepared blowfish. As that consensus 
was built, poisoning incidents fell—even in the category of at-home 
poisonings, even as blowfish consumption increased, and even as some 
scientists argued that blowfish toxicity was increasing.87  
For this claim I have a nugget of evidence that I hope Haley will 
appreciate. In a review of a book (not mine) that relied largely on 
quantitative data, Haley remarked that the authors “offer no data, not a 
single incident, not even one anecdote . . . not even a whisper, a wink, or a 
nod. The silence deafens.”88 In (tenuous) support of my case, then, I offer 
the following incident. 
At a blowfish dinner in Oita, the chef approached my table to ask how 
we liked the variously prepared dishes. I expressed my appreciation, and 
turned the conversation to regulation in the hopes that I would have an 
anecdote for this essay. What effect, I asked, does a licensing scheme have 
on blowfish poisonings? The chef answered, “For chefs like me, it makes 
no difference. I trained to prepare blowfish to serve it properly, not to pass 
a test.” I led my witness further: “So are you saying that the test doesn’t 
matter? Oita doesn’t even require it.” His response: “No, the test is 
important, even if we don’t have one here. It sends a message to laypeople 
that they can’t prepare up blowfish on their own. Even my own mother 
stopped trying to serve blowfish when I told her that it was so hard to do it 
right that you had to have a license.” 
 
 
 86. REGARDING THE SANITARY PRESERVATION OF BLOWFISH, supra note 49.  
 87. “[O]ne speculation is that since tetrodon fish have become scarce in off-shore waters in 
Japan, the fishing fleets had to go farther out to sea to obtain such fish which may be more toxic than 
those living closer to the shores.” Kao, supra note 19, at 1005. 
 88. John O. Haley, Book Review, 30 J. JAPANESE STUD. 235, 236 (2004) (reviewing J. MARK 
RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003)). 
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CONCLUSION 
In the most comprehensive scientific study of blowfish poisoning to 
date, C.Y. Kao wrote in 1966 that “it may be fair to say that the incidence 
of tetrodon poisoning in Japan has been brought to the lowest possible 
rate. To further reduce this incidence may require very drastic measures 
that would probably be as successful as Prohibition was in the United 
States.”89  
He probably was wrong. The measures that Japan used to lower 
poisoning rates—licensing schemes and the like in less than half of its 
prefectures—were anything but drastic. And yet they mattered. Poisonings 
likely fell not because of the threat of legal action, but because of the law’s 
role in publicizing the problem, a consensus-building function that Haley’s 
work predicts.  
 
 
 89. Kao, supra note 19, at 1006. 
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